An open letter via a reply to Dr. M.A.Foust and in retrospect over the beginning of ISCWP
Li Youzheng, one of original advisors of ISCWP
Dear Dr. Mathew A. Foust and all colleagues, Thank you very much for your kindly reply. As you know, comparative studies in any fields are always involved in different epistemological complicity. In the view of the present discussions implicative of current general academic conditions, please permit me to compose an open letter by this chance to re-clarify my position concerned and to express my personal opinion about comparative philosophy in general further.
As a participant ofthe advisory team of ISCWPsince its formative periodmaybe I’d better talk more about its background from my angle; namely in disconnection from any consideration about professional-business. As an old independent philosophy researcher with over 60 years’ ceaseless practice in China, Europe and America, like most of you, I started from Mach, Russell and Vienna Circle since late 1950’s. Later my analytical interest was expanded to larger modern Austrian theoretical horizon in 1960, including that started by Husserl. His Logical Investigations aroused a high interest of Russell who even shew an intention to give it a book review but failed. In my interpretation, even if in such a narrow field of “logical philosophy” or “logical semantics” the sufficient exchange among different logicians could be blocked by some innate “disciplinary demarcation”. It’s well known that as so profound a modern logical thinker Husserl himself was not familiar with current mathematical logic either. If we say that is because the two logical masters obviously belong to different analytical lines, then how could we interpret the fact that even within Husserlian-directed phenomenological circle most of his earlier followers, despite taking his Logical Investigations as a new foundation for a promising philosophical perspective, almost all of them refused his little bit later finished masterpiece “Ideen I”. That means, Husserl himself carries out two phenomenological projects with different epistemological focuses and operative frames at two stages. Precisely, those theoretical procedures function along different “disciplinary-tracks” at a micro level. (The same reason could be suitable to interpret different phenomenological tastes between the American-analytical-lined phenomenology and the self-consciousness-central lined one despite that they share the same general title: phenomenology). While, according to Hao Wang锛“Ideen I”was even highly appreciated by K. Goedel, who, as the great analytical logician, could pay a serious attention to this Husserlian theoretical kernel---structural anatomy of consciousness and egoism---in separation from his own scientific-logical way. The above mentioned sophisticated theoretical divergence/conflict among colleagues working under the same scholarly category hints a basic problem about the epistemological-exchanging obstacle existing in the apparently same professional field that could contains a variety of special disciplinary mechanisms that would obstruct consistent or coherent theoretical dialogue among their players; let alone so many contemporary academic schools and trends sharing the same but merely historically formed traditional category---philosophy. For example, the title “phenomenological movement” popularized in America presents a rather misleading perspective about the untrue existence of unified phenomenological way of doing philosophy. And the generally accepted myth of the so-called twin-masters Husserl and Heidegger in the artificially unified phenomenological stream, according to my judgment, is also ambiguously misguiding with respect to our knowledge about the true continental philosophical picture today. The fact is, the two thinkers are even essentially oppositional to each other at main levels despite their sharing a lot of basic terms. 銆恡erms look like bricks that could be used to differently structuring銆慐ven the self-claimed typical interdisciplinary-directed field “international semiotics” also contains mutually oppositional and unbridgeable schools in the same organizations although they pragmatically prefer to accept it for their respective professional benefits. With respect to “philosophy” as such, as well known, the essential distinction between the Anglo-American and the continental philosophies (each of the both insists on representing the orthodox-philosophical direction) exposes the existence of innate disciplinary-institutional obstruction under the current rapidly changed modern intellectual contexts. 銆怲his is just one of the major semiotic subjects, as I personally emphasize within IASS. Simply, we are lacking in communicative common denominator in the theoretical humanities and the semiotic purposes to find the way to realize the communicative intelligibility among different intellectual traditions in the world. It is a pity that the American-directed semiotics based on pragmatics and cognition sciences completely neglects this essential feature of the semiotic way of thinking.銆慣hat means, current philosophical and other theoretical communications of the humanities are universally faced with an unavoidable epistemological/pragmatic challenge caused by disciplinary-institutional demarcations. In neglect of all above explicit and implicit dialogic obstacles the genuine creative or reformative development of philosophy would be naturally retarded. The present-day academic pragmatism, however, tends to disregard or even cover this general theoretical challenge of our high-scientifically changed times.
In light of the above brief explanation, the same difficulty concerning the so-called comparative western-Chinese philosophy as “a field” could be doubly serious and challengeable. With respect to their language, composition, structure, function, utility and style, these two “world of philosophy” are totally differently organized because of their different intellectual histories. The ideal for attaining more satisfactory level of performing western and Chinese philosophical exchange, instead of mere activities done in the practical-directed sinology, in future, should be one of scholarly efforts of comparative scholars. That was why I could immediately take an interest in the idea aboutISCWP aroused by my old colleague Mou Bo when we got together by the end of last century. 銆恘ote: We had been colleagues at Philosophy Institute, CASS, in 1980’s; and in late 1990’s Bo tried to have found me through asking Richard Rorty, who had then moved to Stanford and I also just settled down in Bay Area at the same time. Rorty had been my sponsor when I visited Princeton Philosophy 1982 and later I introduced his thought to China mainly through translating his Philosophy and Mirror of Nature 1987, as part of my then efforts to help pushing forward Chinese-American philosophy immediately after the end of the Cultural Revolution. It is a pity, however, that Rorty had no interest in my main theoretical interests: phenomenology, hermeneutics and structural-semiotics. By the way, I’d like to emphasize here that these three theoretical directions are extremely applicable to reinterpreting Chinese philosophy and the traditional humanities in terms of modern intelligible language.銆
According to my stance, comparative Chinese-western philosophy should be one of the most important nevertheless most difficult “interdisciplinary” practices. To strengthen the interdisciplinary tendency (not only between Chinese and western but also that between the American and the continental) of the designed society, as an advisor invited by the founding president Mou, I indeed helped him to have invited some distinguished European professors as advisors of the new society. I remember there were at least four people invited through my recommendations. They were: * Paul Ricoeur, the editor/writer: Main Trends of Philosophy, published by UNSCO, translated by me before my visiting Princeton and Columbia 1982. Despite being a selection of scientific reports it indicates an extensively interdisciplinary-directed horizon. Ricoeur is one of rare western philosophers with interdisciplinary outlook. * B. Waldefenls, a former president of German Phenomenology Society and a famous expert about comparative German-French phenomenology * E. Holenstein, a leading Swiss philosopher锛宎 comparative philosopher in connection with semiotics, phenomenology and hermeneutics. * Eso Kern, one of leading comparative philosophers about Husserlian phenomenology/Indian-Buddhist/Confucian ethics
All of the four are comparative-directed philosophers in a large sense (even Rorty is also an important multi-comparative philosopher engaged in pragmatic/analytical/Heideggerian/mostmodern-literary study) and they are either specialized or interested in Chinese philosophy as well. So in my original opinion ISCWP could be a base for launching a freshly adventurous attempt towards organizing the multi-comparative intellectual/theoretical communication between current western philosophical/theoretical frontiers and the classical Chinese humanities centralizing in ethics; namely, to attempt to arrange the task of modernizing “sinological philosophy” in a modern and large enough intellectual context. 銆怚t is a pity that this special advisory arrangement has not functioned really till now. A basic functional confusion between the advisor and the member could be better reexamined in future, I think.銆慣hus锛宼his efforts can indicate why I could be engaged in the initial formation of ISCWP while I had been busily engaged in promoting interdisciplinary/ cross-cultural humanities theories on basis of IASS framework.
Why the so-called Chinese philosophy (exactly this imported title should refer to the entire quasi-theoretical thoughts in traditional Chinese humanities; “Chinese philosophy” is obviously interdisciplinary-directed by nature.) could be theoretically interesting universally today? As well known, almost every great western classical philosopher would take ethics or moral philosophy as one of their last stages of life-long philosophizing. Moreover, according to the experience of my own particular intellectual practice, philosophy and ethics should be separated epistemologically as two scientific fields. In other words, the ethical is by no means limited within the traditional philosophical frame; there should be a new discipline of “ethical science” in future which must contain all past related philosophical wisdom but still further much more beyond that. This proposed disciplinary separation is extremely connected with comparative Chinese-western philosophy. On the other hand, Chinese traditional ethical thought is, far from being a mere marginal learning in the world academy, certainly a very original/instructive/inspiring source implicitly useful to any modern comprehensive reflection on ethical problematics of mankind. However, like all kinds of traditional quasi-theoretical discourse in the traditional Chinese scholarship, the historical-transmitted formulations of its intellectual discourse created/accumulated in pre-modern periods should be (at expressive plane) modernized so as to become more effective communicable with other related modern theoretical systems in the world. This is also one of our tasks about the so-called “Chinese semiotics” that has been a preparative vehicle helping carry out the linguistic program to firstly increase its expressive acceptability and substantial intelligibility within the current social-human scientific contexts in our current globalized world.
But as everywhere today, I find, following the universal professionalization of the humanities since 1960’s, the traditional scholarly idealism of thinking for truth has been totally transformed to the present-day academic utilitarian pragmatics; accordingly, scholarship firstly functions as the means to be used to search for professional benefits within the organized institutions. In this regard, the philosophizing today works on two different levels: first, as the professional instrument or material to be used by professionals in a purely utilitarian way, which is rather restricted by related institutional rules and academic marketing; second, as the mission for free intellectual/spiritual creation, as numbers of great intellectuals did in intellectual history. Regarding comparative western-Chinese philosophy (this can only be grasped as a tentative dialogic platform rather than as a well organized yet scientific-operative body till now), if it is directed to the former, that’s one thing; if it is directed to the latter, that is another thing. And the two mutual-conflicting motivations for doing philosophy are almost objectively determined and required. This pragmatic dilemma is of course something beyond possible solution. It is the recent discussions around future development of ISCWP among colleagues made me go back to its original story.
The above self-statement could hopefully present an informative reference for more critically reflecting the epistemological background of comparative theoretical dialogues. According to my own semiotic point-view, the semiotic analysis also contains a significant task: the analysis of institutional mechanism of the humanities. And my own study about humanist ethics, which is deeply linked to the traditional Chinese way of ethical thinking, is certainly part of the comparative western-Chinese philosophy. So I’d like to take the chance to re-present a further clarification of my own point-view in our field. After all, semiotics is also an all-round comparative study in relation to all areas of the theoretical humanities. Attached here is a recent publication of my English paper selection concerning the similar subjects for possible comments of you.
Li Youzheng ** ** ** The Letter of Dr. Mathew A. Foust to Li Youzheng
Dear Li Youzheng:
Although it is never happy news when a distinguished scholar steps down from the Advisory Board, I want to let you know my positive impression of your message. Thank you for your careful consideration in this decision, your past years of advisory service to ISCWP, and sharing your current work. Your work on humanist ethical theory seems interesting and important to consider. As for your translations of Husserl, I do not know much of his philosophy, but understand that his phenomenology is a major contribution to Western thought (and perhaps not unlike that of William James, with whom I am more familiar).
Wishing you the best in these and future endeavors, Mat
-- Co-Director, International Studies Co-Coordinator, American Studies
Central Connecticut State University
(Edit:youzhengli) |
MY EMAIL : liyouzheng@gmail.com