The Power-organizing and the Ethic-thinking as two paralleled praxes in historical existence of mankind— A semiotic analysis of their functional segregation

Key words: power, ethic, history, function, human sciences

Abstract:

This article is dealt with at a historical-strategic level. Historical processes can be functionally divided into two sections: the social-material-directed Power-organizing part and the cultural-spiritual Ethic-thinking part. Thus there exist two corresponding dynamic-operative functions in history, which are guided and impelled by different motivations, methods, and destinations involved in the two functions. The Ethic-practicing praxis has been always performed through the empirical-humanist-rational ways, which today can be more effectively embodied in human sciences to be reorganized by the general-semiotic (GS) strategy. So there are two kinds of human historical courses: the one as the materialist-directed power-organizing part and the other as spiritual-theoretical-directed ethic-reflecting part. From a historical-philosophical point of view, the former is to prepare the material-conditions/means for supporting the latter as the ethic-spiritual mission that is directed towards exploring the meaning/value foundation for human existence. Lacking in the internal link between the two historical-pragmatic functions the ethic-spiritual praxes should manage to find a separate strategy for actively continuing its independent ethic task by dint of wisely/bravely shunning the materialist-determinism issued from the technical/ commercialized globalization era.

Key words: power, ethic, history, function, human sciences

Part 1   The two basic practicing mechanisms in human history

1. Introductory explanations about alphabet-signs used in the article

This article deals with relational problems of the heterogeneous interaction between the social/interpersonal-organizing practices and the ethic/spiritual-organizing practices in human history. To concisely discuss this complicated but important topic the author has to use two sets of alphabet letters “A, A1, A2” and “B, B1, B2” in the paper to represent two types of general practicing tendency in history by which we respectively use A to represent the social/interpersonal realm and use B the ethic/intellectual realm; to use A1 and B1 to represent two corresponding practicing-“logics” or -“mechanisms” respectively applied in A and B, and to use A2 and B2 as two corresponding resultants separately produced by A1 and B2. The central topics in our discussion are about the mutual relationship between A1 and B1 as two heterogeneously constitutive/organizing impulses/procedures that produce two main dynamic modalities/itineraries in historical processes. The detailed usages of each signs will be given in the text. This article is intended to point out that the dialectic/dynamic interaction between A1 and B1 should be a highly significant theme to be dealt with by general semiotics (GS).

The mental wisdom of mankind has been always separately applied in these two sections in history, naturally shaping two different kinds of practicing functions. In spite that the two sections have been often intermingled together in actual life, an implicitly operated functional dichotomy can be definitely found in history. Two central types of wisdom applied in A and B are characterized essentially by two different wisdom-applying logics. As regards A, it is embodied in a pan-power-organizing logic (A1), and as regards B, it is embodied in a pan-ethic-organizing logic (B1). In fact A1 and B1, as two central modes of intelligent-practical activities in A and B, represent two divergent constantly repeated organizing mechanisms in historical life. Accordingly, we name the main parts of productions of A1 and B1 respectively as A2 and B2. A2 refers to the main institutional skeletons of power-hierarchy of all sorts; B2 refers to the explicit/implicit intellectual deposits of humanist ethical/scientific ways of thinking in history. If A2 implies its axiological double aspects: the good and the bad (but in our discussion we do not treat this distinction problem) and then B2 is innately axiological-positioned: the good or positive (in a humanist-justified sense), just like the way we take any scientific approach.

In general, we could say that the main substantial content of human history consists of phenomena in these two sections, which are in this article marked shortly as “A-set” consisting of A, A1, A2 and as “B-set” consisting of B, B1, B2. In brief, A1 indicates the so-called power-organizing logic and B2 indicates the so-called ethic-spiritual-creating logic. A1 and B1 amount to the dualistic conceptions of “historical-organizing functions” that are taken as implying real pushing-forward forces, axiological directions and organizing manners concerning historical actions/events. This functional bifurcation hints therefore also at an essential division of praxes of human being in history: the one directed towards the Power-constructing way (as a technique about interpersonal domination) and the other directed towards the Ethic-creating way (as a thinking about meaning/value of existence and ideal of human life). The point is emphasized that these two necessary dynamic-logics always work separately, or in a paralleled way, in historical processes, keeping each other’s internally divergent practicing courses although their working grounds/materials (A and B) and their productions (A2 and B2) are actually merged together and therefore indeed externally interacted with each other. In brief, internally A1 and B1 work separately while externally they are still in interaction. The so-called internal aspects of A1 and B1 refer to their different determinative dynamic-sources/driving origins, directed aims and employed methods. This paper is attempted to focus on the internal segregation and the external interaction between A1 and B1 expressed in various social/cultural/scholarly contexts.

If A and B represent the general realms in historical world and then A2 and B2 represent the essential parts of A and B, these four signs refer still totally to changeable historical-social-cultural phenomena. By contrast, A1 and B1 especially refer to the constant driving sources and organizing/practicing mechanisms (or metaphorically,  “practicing logics”), and especially to the organizing/practicing motivation and destination, namely focusing on the dynamic-operative ways of applied intelligence. A1 and B1 present themselves as driving mechanisms consisting of various “parameters” such as the impulsive inclinations or mental motives, instinctive desires or passions, faiths in certain values, specially conducting wisdoms, as well as fixed terminals or goals. So both A/B and A2/B2 refer to the produced consequences of actual historical agents and A1/B1 especially to the related producing mechanisms as such, which are indeed more fundamental than their productions in a historical hermeneutic term. A1’s central character is expressed by the Power-building manipulations and B1’s central feature is the Ethic-reflecting creations; the former is a social-pragmatic dynamic entity formed by psychological-physical forces and the latter is an ethic-spiritual structuring entity formed by subjective thought only. Exactly, the contrast between A1 and B1 is essentially presented as that between two different kinds of inner-impulse/outer-terminals, the one for the materialist-power-operating and the other for the ethic-spiritual-elaborating. A1 and B1, these two sets of instinctive impulses, operative methods and practicing ends, have existed in permanent tension in history. And, in my interpretation, they are exactly also the general dual-driving forces (the power-organizing and the ethic-creating) and paralleled axiological guidance (respectively for building social-hierarchic order and for advancing ethic-understanding) in shaping the characteristic modality of human history. In certain sense we may assert that A1 and B1, the two basic practicing organizing impulses/terminals innately rooted in human nature, are the central mechanisms for determining historical developments, and all other external factors such as natural/economic phenomena and conditions are only the contexts, materials and tools to be employed by A1 and B1. Facing their each other’s changeable historical/geographic conditions and materials, A1 and B1 always keep their own constant dynamic-organizing identities characterized by the stable impulsive inclinations and fixed pragmatic orientations.

2. Two orientations of historical practices and two applicable functions: Power-

       Materialist-directed vs. Ethic-Spiritual-directed constructions     

In this paper we use A1 to indicate the entire driving sources and organizing mechanisms concerning all kinds of power/hierarchy building activities, including various practical (applied) knowledge used for their power-constructing tasks. The latter has evolved from its primitive wisdom practicable in actions to the modern applied social scientific/ technical knowledge. And we use B1 to indicate the entire driving sources and organizing mechanisms concerning the attempts for advancing ethic-elaborating thoughts, which especially refers to the special efforts towards the aim for the ethic-spiritual thought interweaving activities that has been enwrapped in all social-cultural-intellectual phenomena. In short, both A1 and B1 especially refer to the two practice-organizing lines, marked metaphorically by logics or mechanisms, which operate and make their respective productions in historical processes.  In other words, human history is basically driven and guided by a Power-organizing-mind and an Ethic-organizing-mind simultaneously as well as separately. These two functions remain to be unchanged in history, while by contrast their contexts and productions must be changeable from time to time; therefore behind variegated historical phenomena there always hidden two kinds of constant driving forces. The former especially refers to the central part of all social-political activities/events, namely to the interpersonal power structure shaping; and the latter especially refers to the elaboration/sublimation of secular-humanist ethical spirit realized in all ethic-intellectual activities. (“Secular” here is synonymous with empirical and scientific)

The main modes of A2 and B2 as fruitions produced in history have undergone constant changes following the developments in historical processes. For example, regarding A, we may say that A2 evolved from the religious (at the primitive period), the political (at the feudal-despotic period) and the economic (at the capitalist period); regarding B, we may say that B2 started from its inceptive ethic-consciousness (at the primitive period) and developed to the traditional literary-philosophical modes (in the pre-capitalist period), and finally, following the progress of natural and social sciences, to the mode of human sciences today. Then human sciences have finally become a more effective working grounding on which B1 can more effectively proceed with its relevant practices. In contrast with the scientific/technologic–directed history of globalization under the control of the present power hierarchy (A2), which presents a characteristic of the economic-power-monopoly organizing (A1), B1/B2 begins to present more clearly its tasks in reconstructing the humanist-ethical/empirical-rational-directed knowledge about humanity itself in confrontation with the present economic-central dominating contexts (A1/A2). It is exactly in the times of formation of present-day human sciences that B1 becomes more conscious of its own genuine destination that should be focused on exploring the new humanist ethical underpinnings deeply penetrating human sciences. Besides, in our terminological usage, the individual/concrete roles and the general/ abstract functions (A1, B1) in historical processes should be distinguished too. No doubt, A1 and B1 specially refer to the implicitly existing two functioning mechanisms at general level although they are actually and unevenly realized and embodied in numberless of actual practices carried out by actual persons and groups in history.

Now we should add that our definition and description about A1 are given value-neutrally without touching problems about social-political goodness or badness but rather merely with a special focus on operative features of its power-organizing ambition and technique, which consists, among its various parameters given, essentially of the following: desire/impulse for organizing and controlling the collectives or groups of people, capability in propaganda and interpersonal-struggling tactics, inclination for establishing the hierarchic order and general pragmatic-wisdom. In comparison, our definition and description of B1 are given only byone-dimensional axiological position,which consists of thinking about the secular-ethical-elaboration and the human-scientific-rationality. (In contrast withthe supernatural-morality and the intellectual irrationality). As a matter of fact,we may say thatthere are two heterogeneous aspects in human historical development that are impelled separately by the material-social-tended and the spiritual-ethical-tendedpsychological sources, which are marked respectively by A1 and B1. Our interpretation can also be described this way: the internal separation of A1 and B1 and their external interaction co-shape the bi-dimensional historical-pragmatic modality of mankind.

The two major historical-practicing tracks are realized only at the abstract or general level while they are concretely/dispersedly carried by different people as actual agents. We could name A1 and B1 alternatively as logics, mechanisms or functions. That means, in historical realities the actual people are only somewhat participants in performing functions A1 or B1, by different degrees and at different self-conscious levels. So A1 and B1 are only the indicators of the two general functions concerning historical developments that are certainly embodied in different events and phenomena. In a word, a “function” means exactly the definite features of the organizing-mechanism/logic for producing the related resultants or accumulative productions (A2 or B2) in general practical inclinations.

The bi-aspectual contrast of the two materialist/spiritual-organizing “historical tracks” (defined in reference to their origins, functioning ways and resultant modes)indicate the two divergentinstinctiveimpulses in human beings: the one desire/action is to organize interpersonal-dominatingpower of different kindsthrough establishing various types of institutional hierarchies by their special wisdom and applied knowledge on one hand,and the another desire/action is to searchforthe way to more effectively increase and advance the spiritual-ethical learningabout desirable modality ofhuman life. The function of Power-organizingcorresponds to any actions of interpersonal domination, including financial-material, faith-spiritual, body-physical and ideologicalhierarchy-formations, if all of them, including both physical-material and cultural-ideological phenomena, have a coercive/compulsory strength to control or determine the establishment of social orders and economic activities. By contrast, the ethical-spiritual activities，as pure thought，are concerned only about continuouslyadvancing self-understanding about meaning/value concerning human existence. Working together with external elements of different kinds these two basic self-existing historical-practicing functions indicate two mutually separate locomotive-impulsive strengths. Therefore, following the changes of the interconnections between A and B in historical developments the related consequences of the external relationship between A1 and B1 will be changed as well. That means, when the division between A and B become more clearly distinctive since modern times, the type of the external causational relationship between A1 and B1 will be readjusted accordingly. This is just what we see in our globalization times: The modern materialist-central life-style and the traditional rational-spiritual praxis for ethic-elaboration have turned to be more than ever mutually separated and constitutively heterogeneous, and therewith their external causational relationship has become further closely-tied; namely, the influence of A1 upon B1 or the domination of A1 over B1 becomes more unprecedentedly pressing. ¹The fact is that when the A-set (A, A1, A2) in our present-day globalization period becomes legally more justifiable, the B-set (B, B1, B2) could become even ethically less applicable. Once again we further experience a heterogeneous-distinctive tension between the external social-legal logic and the internal spiritual-ethical logic in our current historical situations.

3. “Influence on” and “making use of” in external interaction between A1 and B1

As we explained above, A1 and B1 as the two separate organizing mechanisms work separately in their different operative pathways, keeping mutually disconnected logics, but at external level there certainly exists the causal interaction between them. Exactly, this indirect external influence of A1 upon B1 can be realized only passively, namely by weakening the operative external conditions and efficiency of B1-practicing, although A1 is unable to touch the inside of B1 dynamic autonomy. Still, this indirect influence could after all produce negative effects on praxis of B1. Despite its organizing self-defensive reactions against pressures from A1, B1 is definitely unable to counter-influence directly the inside of A1 either. In comparison with everyday saying that B1/B2 is able to actively brings about “influence” on A1/A2 (as the Thought influences the Power), we prefer to rename this active words “influence on” A1 with the passive words “being used by” A1. Anyhow, even at the external level, the so-called indirect interaction between A1 and B1 is performed in asymmetric mode or according to only one-directed way. As a matter of fact, we say that A1 can externally/indirectly change the status of B1-practicing through actually influencing B1’s practicing conditions, nevertheless the reversal is not true. Consequently, if an “influence” of B1 upon A1/A2 seemingly occurs, the fact could be just that the direction of mutual action is reversal: It is A1 that makes use of the productions of B1/B2. In essence, we attempt here to divide this external interaction by different phrases - “the intentional influence” and “the making use of” - in order to more clearly specify the acting-direction involved in external/indirect interaction between A1 and B1. Simply speaking, it is A1 that can externally  “make use of” B1’s productions (B2). Therefore, in everyday sense, we may briefly describe that only the “power-holder” has capability to influence the pure “thinker”, and the thinker, regardless of his intention, has no capability of directly influencing the power-holder. If the so-called influence of the thinker upon the power-holder seems to happen, the fact might be that the power-holder actively chooses accepting the idea issued from the thinker as a useful stuff for A1. Or, the thinker functions only as an “idea-provider” for possible uses by the power-holder who is of course able to freely “use” anything available. What we stress here lies in that this process of one-sided causation reflects only a realization of will of the power-holder by influencing the practicing status of B1: causing favorable or unfavorable conditions in connection with B1’s praxes. The inference that the two cases are essentially different implies a highly significant reinterpretation about the actual relationship between A1/A2 and B1/B2, or, more popularly, about that between the “Power-organizing” and the “Ethic-organizing”. How much useful or applicable an intention of B1/B2 (to say, some ethical thought) could have with respect to A1/A2 (to say, for some social action), any possible intentional effect can only be once-sidedly decided and adopted by A1-organizing power itself within its special contexts and in accordance to all his other related factors. It is A1 that is the final determiner in the external interaction between A1/A2 and B1/B2. In other words, in case an A1-carrier does accept an intention/opinion originating from a B1-carrier he is still restricted by all of other organizing parameters that are regulated by A1-logic as such. So this statement raised here has nothing to do with personal moral attitudes of A1-carrier, for he, as an A1-logic-agent, as the entity functioning at the general/abstractive level, has to obey the operative mechanism of A1-logic.

The above-introduced interpreting model can lead us be clearer about mutual relationship or interaction between A-set (A, A1, A2) and B-set (B, B1, B2), especially about the relationship between A1 and B1, as the two paralleled organizing mechanisms concerning social power and ethic-thought respectively. Now let’s see a historical example about the causational relationship between the Enlightenment(B2) and the French Revolution(A2). ¹Despite the obvious historical phenomena of the close interaction of the two phenomena embodied even in the same groups of people but we should penetrate the social-superficial phenomena to reach the two different processes of interaction formed at so-called functional levels. Then should we distinguish between the causal-relational type of B1/B2 externally influencing A1/A2 (a thought produces an effect on the power-holder) and that of A1/A2 making use of B1/B2 (a power-holder chooses a thought)? With the independent conceptions of historical-practicing functions this distinction concerning the nature of the causal-relation is necessary and useful because both A1 and B1, despite their sharing the same or similar related external objects and contexts, always keep their respective independent “inside-practicing logics” that, as the fixedly-directed impelling-sources/inclinations, should be taken as the really determinative factors to make A2 and B2 established respectively. Therefore all other elements involved in the related resultant events are only the external materials, tools available and other factors to be employed for attaining the definite aims in the related historical situations. (For example, if concrete persons are engaged in two realms A and B but the included relevant elements would be respectively interweaved into different functional resultants at collective/abstractive levels formed by A1 and B1) Once again, objectively speaking, contexts, conditions, means, materials related to the two kinds of practicing-logics must be variegated, while subjectively speaking, the two organizing mechanisms as such always keeps each other’s unchanged independent dynamic autonomies. Regarding this example the abstractly defined A1 was concretely carried by different actualpower-holders (such as the king family, aristocracy, church, revolting plebeians, revolutionary leaders, as well as the related ideologies regarding the French Revolution) and the abstractly defined B1is concretelycarried byall Enlightenment-related humanist thoughtsbefore and during the French Revolution period.This conclusion implies an emphatic point that the social Power-organizing and the ethical thought-organizing always keep, implicitly but determinatively, each other’s independent dynamic-practicing logics in human history, although the actual carriers of A1 and B1 (as actual personnel, related circumstances, historical processes and produced consequences) could be complicatedly intermingled together. The related causational network and consequences in that historical period must be interconnected in different ways, still, however, there must be two self-existing driving mechanisms that operate separately at the functional level. According to common sense, if an idea of the “thinker” is anyhow accepted by the “actor”, namely the same idea indeed appears in the both sides it seems to be reasonable to say that the thinker “influences” the actor. But the saying neglects that in this case the idea plays its roles in different mental contexts consisting of different elements regarding the two sides that keep each other’s divergent operative logics. Moreover, after all our statement about these two independent functional-logics doesn’t assert that they should be regarded as so-called “determinative factors” of history. In fact, no such straightforward-lined causational determinative mechanism exists in history, either psychological or social-material by nature, as many traditional historical philosophers simplistically say; what exists in history is only multi-causal network implying at random numberless of uncertain factors emerging in history. Among which A1 and B1 keep their own functional independency and dynamic autonomy belonging to their different pragmatic poles that provide the favorable opportunity for their spontaneous praxes. There exists no objective determinism but only a so-called “subjective determinism” defined in our above descriptions.

Another example is given from the history of ancient China. IfA2represents the formative period of the Qin-Han imperial despotic system and B2especially refers to the ren-ethical school created by Confucius (as a quasi-secular-humanist rational ethics) and the so-called Legalist school (as the ideologically despotic-inclined and intellectually rational-utilitarian, strategic/tactic-directed, political/military dogma/technique), which both belong to the so-called Pre-Qin Thought existing prior to the Imperialist Period initiated by the Qin-Denasty. It is the Qin/Han-Confucianist-imperialist power-tradition (as A1 in this example) that intentionally and synthetically made use of both the Legalist Thought and the humanist ren-ethics as its two kinds of pragmatic-tactic/ideological-educational tools for consummating the lasting empire system in China history. Regarding the despotic system the legalist-strategy-thought forms its “hard core” and the deviated Confucian thought forms its “soft core”; or, the legalist conquer-loving technique created by the legalist masters made a deviate use of the peace-loving ren-humanist learning of Confucius to create a newly united political-social-academic dogmatism of Confucianism that has become the very ideological/technical foundation of the Empirical Tradition) In this case we shouldn’t say that it was the ren-ethical-directed  pragmatic  wisdom (as B1) that was part of causes helping form the establishment of the Empire (as A1/A2); instead, it is the independent will and strategy/tactics of the historically existing empirical Power-mechanism called the legalist thought (as A1) and its wise applicants (as A1-carriers) that had carried out a successful political-military unification of the land by violence. But after all it was the legalist-inclined power-holders who successfully made use of both Pre-Qin original Legalist-tactics and the deformed (tactically used) Confucian thought to support their despotic-power constructive programs. The reason of our argumentation lies in distinguishing the spontaneous organizing will-practices from its used objects, tools and contexts. It is especially the case that the despotic power-holders alternatively/dialectically make use of two mutual contrary wisdoms (the Confucian-humanist-ren ethics, which is a pure intellectual autonomy and the imperialist power’s legalist-tactic/moral position) to had successfully constructed their Imperialist foundations; although the part of Confucian ethical learning was intentionally and purposely “misused” by the despotic-Power organizer as a despotic-moral-training tool. (Refer to Li 2015) By contrary, the legalist’s position is completely in accordance with the imperialist power-will, and as a matter of fact the Empire’s political/military ambition and the legalist political philosophy/strategy (an oriental extreme type of Machiavellism) had been really intermixed into a historical totality. Confucian Thought¹, as the original humanist ren-ethics created by the person called Confucius, has been terminologically mixed by the Han-despotic power-holder who used the part of Confucian thought to form a despotic-academic ideology “ru-learning” added with its fake master “Confucius”. To distinguish between the two in terms of this original terminological mixture this author use the term “Confucianism” (ru) to represent the despotic ideology and the term “Confucian thought” (ren) to represent the original ethical thought created by Confucius. (Refer to Li 1997) This terminological-mixing trick could be roughly compared with a modern one regardless of their any axiological inclinations: the original Marx’ Thought has been so much disorderly mixed with a variety of mutual-conflicting schools of Marxism that were created later independently in different countries and by different groups, causing extensive confusions till today. This kind of terminological confusions has been often intentionally designed and carried out in different social-historical contexts by different power-organizing agents.

 The similar cases can be further enumerated in the following. In the 20^th century world, let’s use A1/A2 to refer toall kinds of revolutionary activities (as a type of the new power-constructing attempts) and their related social consequences, and let’s use B1/ B2to refer tothe humanist ethical-idealism implied inall socialist thoughts initiated in the 19^th century. Apparently there exist some link of the same transmitted term “socialist thought” shared by the two trends (the one refers to the intellectual part of a socialist idealism movement and the other refers to the actual social activities in the great organizing systems) but in fact the early ethical thought is only selectively used by the later social action-applicants, while the two heterogeneously constituted parts actually apply different practicing logics for their different projects (the one is directed towards the ethic-creatively thinking and the other is directed towards the actual power-organizing). Similarly,regarding the case of  Nazi Germany, if A1 representsthe Nazi-power’s actual ideology/strategy that includedsome elements from Nietzesche thought about Power-Will that can be better regarded as onlya pure ethical nihilism without any actual-organizing elements involved.

In consequence, there is at least a question about the functional distinction between two different processes: the “active influence upon” and the “passively being used by”. Roughly speaking, about those examples we state that there has indeed externally existed the causational connections between each B1/B2 and each related A1/A2. But the term “causation” doesn’t present a sense of the “determining direction” or the interactive status of the causational processes. As a result, we may state by mistake that it is the ethical thought (as B1/B2) that causes or produces the power-establishments (as A1/A2)in a causal-connective process. Regardingacausalprocess in history,our special argumentation is intended to further ascertainwhichcausationalside is the actively operative and which side is passively receptive with respect tothe relationship of functionsA1 and B1. Sowe prefer tosay instead that B1/B2is only “used” by A1 (the “thinker/thought” is used by the “power-holder” rather than the former influences/causes the latter). ThereforeB1/B2 would not be interactively responsible for the occurrence of A1/A2. If B1/B2’s ideas happen to be accepted by A1/ A2 in latter’s projects,the corresponding intentions of A1and B1could beby chanceoverlapped. Even if so, we couldn’tsay that B1 and its product B2are part of the intentional factors causing the practices of A1. More exactly, we couldn’ttherefore affirmthat the related practice of A1 indicates the realization of B1’s intentionin A2(even if A1/A2prefers to declare it this way for a propaganda aim). The problem happens once again thatis it meaningful to strictly distinguish between the “influence on” (B1 to A1) and the “making use of” (A1 to B1), or the “realization of an intention of B1 in A1/A2”with respect to historical causal events?The answer is affirmative because both A2 and B2 are organized and impelled by different practicing logics A1 and B1 respectively, and these two organizing logics consist of different sets of functional parameters, including their separate motives and aims, so the segregation between intentional-influencing and non-intentional-causing should be well made in order to help us to more exactly grasp the mechanisms of the two different practicing logics and their products. The meaning of this distinction is expressed in an emphasis on getting rid of faith in the apparent existence of (intentional) causational relationship existing between A1, B1, A2, B2 in order to further outline the factuality about the empirically provable separation of A1 and B1. Or, a pragmatic notion of temporarily/spatially apparent causational links of events frequently emerged in history shouldn’t be intuitively/misleadingly recognized as the intentional-guided causational relationship. Therefore, if an idea in B1-agent is accepted by A1-agent in latter’s project, that can only be taken that the idea from B1 is useful for and therefore could be favorably “used” by A1; nevertheless the related intention of B1’s idea would not be taken as the same intention of A1 in the case. An intention is only defined by its related context and practicing motivation of agent. Accordingly, the B1’s motivation of producing the idea is not the same motivation of A1 that accepts the same idea; if the two “ideas” are the same, but the B1”s motivation for raising the idea and the A1’s motivation for accepting the idea could be different, for both A1 and B1 do not internally share same sets of parameters belonging each other’s organizing mechanisms. We may further clarify this way: the idea itself used by A1 and B1 remains the same but this same thing is used by different operative mechanisms; or, the idea is the same but “how to use it” may be different and therefore this “how” plays a more determinative role than the “is” in actually realizing the use of the idea; in concrete practicing processes the idea becomes an element to be employed by the related “‘how’-mechanisms”.

4. The trio-functional parameters innately contained in two historical-practicing logics

      originating in human nature

For the sake of further outlining the constitutive-pragmatic difference between A1 and B1 we may pay an attention especially tothree crucial parameters of organizing mechanisms— Motive, Method, and Aim.  Accordingly we have the following:

       A1: control-impulse (motivation); empirical rationality (organizing wisdom); directedness towards building interpersonal Power (terminal)

       B1: ethic-impulse (motivation); empirical rationality (organizing wisdom); directedness towards deepening justice-intelligibility (terminal)

Then we can see that the two heterogeneous historical-practicing logics share the same intelligent-directed “wisdom”—empirical-rational way of thinking, although they are axiologically divergent by motivations and orientations. This shared features indicated in using the empirical-rational wisdom leads us to know that both the two operate in the same worldly realms despite functioning at different levels.

We will emphasize that the above-given basic descriptions about the two constant organizing-logics (A1 and B1) always operate spontaneously and separately at the functional levels within always changeable historical contexts. But the resultant historical phenomena can only present themselves as A2/B2 (as historical productions of A1/B1). Between A1 and B1 there exist no internal/direct causational links but indeed exist external/indirect causational links. This double-directed relationship is related to another conceptions of the positive-tended and negative-tended practices regarding A1 and B1 regarding their driving directions. Positive-tended practice means that it proceeds directly towards the construction of its innately planned projects on the basis of its own organizing logic; in this case the another organizing-logic will not be involved. It is in this sense that we say A1 and B1 work separately without mutual interaction involved. Negative-tended practice means that the given organizing-logic should firstly work for excluding or overcoming various obstructive elements caused in its practicing contexts, including the force and its influences come from its opposite organizing-logic. It is in this sense that we say A1 and B1 can work externally in interaction. Or, exactly, A1, as the power-holder, would like to curb or control B1, and B1, as the mere “thinker”, in case of the unfavorable conditions, must defend and protect himself against as well as overcome the unfavorable conditions caused by A1. The negative-tended practices of A1 or B1 can be taken only as the preparative stages for these two organizing-logics; namely, the stages on which A1 and B1 work for gaining more favorable external conditions for continuing their positive practices. In other words, once again, popularly speaking, in their external interaction A1 can make influence on B1, nevertheless the reversal is not true. While the “thinker” as B1-carrier could always cherish a utopian way of self-comforting fantasy that the ideal strength of his thought would influence someday the social reality controlled by power-holders. Such kind of misunderstanding about the function and tasks of B1/B2 would lead to the invalid perspective to the orientation of human sciences.

In terms of this explanation we can further state that even if A1-carrier and B1-carrier adopt the same ethically-affirmative attitude in their projects there cannot exist mutual interaction between A1 and B1 at the functional levels. That means, the multi-external interaction between A1-carrierand B1-carrierwould not change theessential structures ofseparate independent operative procedures performed by the their different organizing-logics. In terms of the above analysis we should further pay an attention upon these separate modes of causation regarding the internal and external interaction between A-set and B-set, especially that between A1 and B1. The inferred conclusion is therefore that we no longer say functionally that A1serves B1or B1serves A1 (by a simplest-popular saying: “a power” and “a thought” directly help each other). Even when concrete A1-carrier and B1-carrier happen to share the same axiological direction in their respective projects (namely, in case a power-holder and a thinker adopt the same ethical intention) they still keep each other’s separate organizing-mechanisms; or, their practicing-ends at the organizing-functional level are different: they keep different organizing tasks (with different “how”). Let’s keep in mind the separation of A1and B1and their social-natural agents (carriers) as the intuitive historical entities, such as persons, works, action, events, and processes. As the concrete functional-carriers they live in the same world and same communities with numberless of causal and intentional interconnections; they would provide each other with the elements requested by each other at intentional-behavioral levels, while there are the abstract functional-filters (“monitors”) automatically to filtrate all historical phenomena into separate processing channels,leading to each other’s different resultant divisions (A2 and B2).

Our seemingly obscure differentiation given above is intended to point out the independent and spontaneous existence of these two instinctively dynamic organizing mechanisms in spite of the much more complicatedly merged historical phenomena externally caused by A1 and B1 and other factors. In a more popular and plain word we can also repeat that these constant historical-practicing momentums are in fact deeply rooted in Human Nature, which, as a basic epistemological conception have been widely denied or rejected by so many contemporary western theoretical thinkers, should be firstly confirmed by the empirically provable existence of these two psychological-motivational sources. Any denial of the factuality of this positive-empirical concept “human nature” would help us further understand why some contemporary philosophers could become so seriously wrong judges of historical-realist dramas in the 20’th century; this denial of the factuality even provides people with various misleading interpretations owing to their anti-positive/empirically sophisticated theorization. ¹By contrast, our statement about two instinctive-innate organizing-logics is just based on this psychological factuality concerning historical existence of human being. This is also the reason why the time really comes that the humanist ethics is especially requested for it is just a empirical-rational foundation of human sciences.

5. Motivational intention/causational effect in the sharpened tensional relationship

      between Power-praxes and Ethic-praxes in the globalization era

The distinction between mixed existence of A1-carrier and B1-carrier and the separate existence of A1and B1should be clearly emphasized. This statement founded on a semiotic separation between the intuitive-empirical and the abstract-functional actions will lead to a very important conclusion that in history the power-organizing practicesand the ethical-spiritual practices should be much more clearly separated as well. The statement will become more and more clearly proved when modern history has come. That means, according as both A2 (as the total social-power-hierarchic-building achievements)and B2 (as the total humanist-ethical/scientific achievements)become much more developed today the mutual separation between two pragmatic-logics becomes also more discernibly distinctive. The fact of the sharpening of this separation indicates that we willhave more reasons to avoid amisunderstanding about supposed existence ofintentional-causal relationship between A1and B1 at their internal-functional levels.

Regarding the content of power, there is a typology of Power that covers political, military, economic, legal, spiritual, academic, ideological, cultural and even religion-spiritual realms. The power is formed or realized in different domains by means of a variety of media and elements as long as the action or results present the relationship or networks of inter-personal/inter-collective control/dominance. As the traditionally-leading typeof power-organizing activities,the political is also the main force to maintain the stability or order of society, in connection with a network of power-hierarchies existing at different domains above-listed.  No doubt, all B1-carriers exist also in socialcontexts governed bythose power-organizations although B1-logic organizes its own projects separately and spontaneously with a result that the productions made by B1-organizing-logic are automatically accumulated in B2.Regarding A1-processes, despite the changeably increased multiplicity and enrichment of power-typology in historical evolutionary trajectories, innate inclination and fixed procedures of A1 remain to be unchanged, namely being always directed towards the effective building-up of the interpersonal/inter-collective organizations of control/domination. With respect to power-organizational areas of various kinds we may use the general humanist-evaluative standards to mark them morally. Allproductions ofA1are realized in different types of the Power-productionsand in differenthierarchic orders. Regardless of their axiological natures defined ethically, all of them should undergo the same organizing procedures guided by A1-logic. For example, all economic situations must be organized by and under control of the objective economic power-mechanisms and turn to strengthen its power-hierarchy quasi-objectively making any social-political-moral inclinations only as part of structural elements used.

In addition, let’s see another literary-sociological phenomenon in connection with the Power-building-up through employing literary-media.A literary phenomenon is a functional compound and only a part of it could be filtrated or deposited into B2as the ethic-implying fruits. In other words, a cultural-natural unit undergoes different organizing processes, in connection to A1and B1separately/simultaneously. For example, the Russian literary classics in the 19’century can be used as a revolutionary-ideological weapon by political radicals in the 20’ century although it implies a purely ethical-spiritual content. In general, if there exist two different aspects involved in one social/cultural/academic event: the original ideas created by a B-carrier and the misused effect manipulated by a power-holder can exist in history at the same time. But the fact is that it could be A1-carrier who delicately makes use of B1-carrier’s idea for a different purpose through employing it as the mere material or tool to build up some ideological-power system. From an intuitively common sense angle, there exists a causal link between these two sides because they share the same intentional element. But as a matter of fact, there are two different kinds of organizing-logics involved in these two different process: The first one is supposed as being performed by B1-logic and the second one is supposed as being performed by A1-logic; namely, the B1’s product is used (misused) as a mere constitutive element by the A1 for organizing its own different plan. Suchakind phenomenon is even much more easily created in all phenomena related to the humanities in general exactly because they lack the objective criteria and standards; and therefore their intellectual productions are more easily made available material to be misused or disorderly used by different kinds of opportunist applications. Partly because of this reason, any theoretical creations realized in one scholarly discipline (to say, philosophy) can be more easily used as the material for shaping any ideological-effects or just used as an intellectual-dominating weapon against the aim of the used original idea. In a word, the same intentional element can be taken as a mere “building-brick” to be used in different building designs through contextually/semantically manipulating or suppressing its original idea; or even further through making use of it as a mere propaganda symbolic index. (For example, making use of a literary/philosophical master’s publicity as a mere ideological weapon through delicately deforming his original thought)

More precisely, as well known, the intention to motivate a work-production is one thing and its results or effect formed in different contexts and by various organizing procedures would be some other thing. Therefore there hardly exists a straightforward causal connection between the motive and the effect concerning one project. Why? Because the intentional activity in mind with its own organizing-logic and the interaction between the work and different factors from different social-cultural-intellectual levels are different processes, each of which keeps its own different organizing-ways. The process of causal interaction itself could becomes the object of a social-cultural power-holder with its own purpose and practicing procedure, so an element in the original practice of B1-carrier can be used only as the tool or medium by the power-holder for the sake of organizing its own project. While quite usually people would misread the element shared by B1-carrier and A1-carrier as the evidence of existence of an intentional causation between the two practices. While the fact could be onlythatit is the B1-carrier just provides the A1-carrier with the material available to be used by the latter in a different project. Why does such kind of thing happen frequently in intellectual history of the humanities, and especially in our globalization era? It is exactly due to the general lack of the scientific-directed knowledge about the generally accepted foundations, prepositions and standards in theoretical/axiological discourses in the humanities. The commercial/technical-directed cultural circumstances, including the richly advanced IA/bio-chemical products, have been transforming the interest of both intellectual elites and majority of masses (majority of masses are instinctively tended to follow the dominant social tendency/fashion that is absolutely determined by A1/A2) to the topics of technical nature that are widely and deeply disconnected from the relevant humanist-ethical/humanist-scientific knowledge. The new generations trained and unified mostly in the standardized technical world would get more and more used to enjoying themselves by the materialist-sensuous ways, that will lead people become naturally disconnected with any serious problems concerning social/human-scientific-theoretical themes. ¹ That is part of the reasons why literary-sympathetic passion, philosophical-obscure reasoning and manipulated/fabricated historical stories could be easily transformed by certain power-holders as the convenient ideological/propaganda weapons. On the other hand, the shortcomings of some professional humanities scholars could be due to their systematically weakened attention to the introspective-psychological experience. As a result, mechanically following the models of natural/social sciences the humanities scholars could naturally tend to adopt the naturalist/pragmatic/behaviorist way of reasoning. While all problems concerning meaning, values, faith, motivation must be related the introspective-psychological reality, which is basically neglected or denied by physical positivism and pragmatism but they are just one of essential parts of human sciences.

Part 2  The two historical praxes applied in multi-tensional network in the humanities

6. The necessarily requested scientific-directed approaches towards the humanities in the

      scientific/technical/commercialized era    

Among all social-cultural and intellectual activities in history we especially focus on the parts with the so-called humanist inclination that implies a prepositional-axiological fixation on a pan-humanism. The latter is not only based on a principle of our humanity-central morality but, scholarly speaking, also owing to a deeper emphasis on the thinking about how to organize or develop a properly rational/scientific way of the human-nature-central ethics and the empirical-positive knowledge about human affairs. This mental/intellectual inclination towards the humanity-central thinking, instead of any supernatural/transcendental interests, has continuously and consistently grew up, evolved and gradually ripened in our long civilization history. There exists a natural and necessary link between the human-central-ethical and the human-central scientific learning, for all human-central ways of thinking must be humanist-ethical-positioned in nature. Different from supernatural-, physical-naturalist- and even materialist-social-central ways of thinking, the human-central learning implies its innate human-nature-central and ethical-axiological stance. The latter has made it more and more separated from other non-humanist modes of thinking. This innate inclination in human nature is even also the historical origin of the contemporary formation of human sciences. In this article we use B-set to refer to the ordinary cultural-intellectual-scholarly phenomena in history, whose earlier historical modes can be classified into the two main types: One is the literary mode, including literature and historiography, characterized by its descriptive and expressive features concerning human life, the other is the philosophical mode, including all kinds of learning such as the natural, social and psychological studies, characterized by its acquisitive and theorizing features. Since the inception of modern times the natural-scientific learning has completely been disconnected from the philosophical/theological-directed modes, and therefore a genuine social/human-scientific part of thinking has been converged on the humanities in general. In early ancient times the philosophical can cover all kinds of thought in connection with natural, social, ethical, metaphysical fields. In its broad sense we may use the phrase “pan-ethical way of thinking” to particularly refer to all thoughts about mind, spirit, value, faith, goals, emotion, instinct, motivation/causation concerning human being.  The ethical learning in this quite broad sense (namely, not limited in the sense used in the ancient and modern ethical disciplines of various types) is the main concerns in the modern humanities or human sciences. Regarding the traditional humanities (B), an axiological/ epistemological-directed spontaneous will (B1), which is implicitly and collectively embodied in intellectual history, has been all the time engaged in carrying out the ethic-spiritual-directed scientific studies about man and history (B2). B1, as a function for organizing the humanist-ethical/scientific learning, has also groped its own right mode of intellectual production or reconstruction along an empirical-rationalizing line driven by that deep-rooted instinctive-impetus for advancing the humanist-scientific-directed ethic-intelligibility. The most recent mode of B2 has been finally reduced to the theoretical part of human sciences today. The theoretical direction of human sciences becomes therefore further to lay an increased human-nature-directed ethical emphasis; or, in other words, a four-set of ethical, humanist, scientific, theoretical aspects becomes further systematically unified in the recently emerging field of human sciences.

Human civilizations have entered their modern stage since the remarkable developments of natural and social sciences; accordingly, the developing emergence of human sciences has also firstly appeared since the end of the 19^th century and been ever more productively progressed since the middle of the 20^th century. This tendency for more substantial modernization of human sciences had attained its recent upsurge when the structural semiotic trend started from 1960”s years prior to the arrival of the globalization period. And since then both the commercialization/professionalization of the humanities worldwide, together with irrational postmodernist-theoretical-trends, have gradually and continuously made the semiotic movement in general to be deviated from their orientation for human-scientific modernization. Structural semiotics and its applied interdisciplinary-theoretical approaches have been weakened by the collaborative results of the materialist-economic-dominating power and the ontological-nihilist/transcendental deviation. As this author pointed out that in fact the latter is essentially and indirectly the consequence of the former.

Modern developments of natural/technological/social sciences have first of all in history provided the humanities with a more rational/effective methodology to improve and advance their knowledge and thought about meaning, value and faith concerning human existence through epistemological-methodological-theoretical reformative advancement, which are characterized by their getting rid of the thousand-years’ rigidified domination of the traditional philosophical-centrism. The professional-institutionalized restrictions caused by the globalization on one hand and the theoretically misleading philosophical dogmatism on the other have become the two main factors obstructing the further development of human sciences. This epistemological accidents happening in the humanities and the semiotic movement, being far from being merely academic events, reflect a profound challenge towards the spiritually desirable orientation of human civilizations. This statement about the semiotic mission and its connection with human sciences in general of course have nothing to do with the present-day popular semiotic phenomena as a mere new occupation; it is linked to what this author names as the general semiotics (GS), a more critical and synthetic epistemological/ methodological strategic way of thinking (as a practicing way of B1), which is inceptively stimulated and directly enlightened by the semiotic structuralism but rather implies a much more significant intellectual inspiration for reflecting and revaluating the general perspective of human future. The main features of this epistemological turning point are just embodied in its interdisciplinary-theoretical-directed theorization against any philosophical-dogmatism. Moreover, this “semiotic/hermeneutic stance” is not caused by any ideological/axiological preference but just comes out of a scientific-directed epistemological-methodological necessity, as we pointed out above.

The current philosophy scholarship as one discipline in philosophical history belongs to the big family of the humanities or human sciences, certainly still keeping its own unique disciplinary significance but on the other hand having already lost its earlier fundamental-guiding potential. Philosophy today should participate in the same interdisciplinary-theoretical reforming programs together with all other human sciences. In terms of this, if the humanities or general semiotics, in disregard of the interdisciplinary-epistemological requirements, still go back to accept certain philosophy as their “basic theoretical foundation”, that not only means a going back to some conservative scholarly position but also indicate a scientific-epistemological backsliding or stagnancy. As a matter of fact, we could even seriously doubt that this insistence in philosophical-centrism either in the humanity-theories in general or in general semiotics in particular just amounts to a theoretical self-castrating. First, this philosophical-centrism has already become invalid today as being a solid theoretical foundation for supporting any disciplinary theorizations; and second it even just becomes an epistemological obstruction against the continuous advancement of current human sciences. No doubt, as this author points out before, this still prevailing philosophy-centrism penetrating the humanities is basically also owing to the commercial-professionalism in academia formed in our globalization period. (For any rigidified theoretical dogmatism easily manipulated could be welcome to the cultural policy of the materialist-commercial domination) Nevertheless, what is said above doesn’t mean to degrade this traditionally accumulated disciplinary value itself but rather to stress a necessity for more rationally redefining and advancing its relevant scientific-theoretical function through encouraging it to participate in an active interdisciplinary-directed practice. With respect to either philosophical-fundamentalism or general semiotic studies the crucial point of the interdisciplinary strategy can be indicated in its central epistemological breakthrough expressed in a systematic anatomy of all related prepositional and fundamental elements underpinning various disciplines and their theoretical connections.

7. The logical nexus between human sciences and humanist ethics: the social-material

      should be the means and the ethical-spiritual should be the end in human historical

      existence   

The intellectual phenomena represented by B in history coverseveral typical stages ranging from the primitive ethical consciousness, historical-literary creations until tothepresent humanities in general. But only the essential part produced by B1-logic, or the so-called the refinery cream in the historical humanities,can be automatically deposited into B2-reservoiras the permanent theoretical accumulation, which consists of different requested/desirable aspects appearing at the ethical-effective, methodological valid, thematic significant, orientation-reasonable and the intellectual-strategic productive levels. The B2-collection in long human history has unconsciously-consistently evolved alonga constant B1-organizing line,or being pushed forward through the organizingpracticesof B1-logic. Only in modern times when natural and social sciences have become extremely more developed, namely when the humanities with their traditional-disorderly composition have turned to be more reasonable and more effective in their new modality of “human sciences” weare able tomore clearly grasp the essential of B2, which is what humanist ethics and human sciences have consistently searched for; and we accordingly could more clearly perceive the desirable segregation of A1-logic and B1-logic,namelythe innately-rooted divergence originating from the desire/action for power-constructing and the desire/thinkingfor exploring deeper ethical/scientific truth. (Let’s use this multi-ambiguous term “ethical” here for it can present a clearer contrast with power-desire in our comparative discussions).

As pointed out above, despite social-physically mixed existence of A1-carriers and B1-carriers in history, these two general functions of A1 and B1, beyond their individual carriers, keep their separately developing courses (these two logics keep their external-causal connections but internal-motivational disconnections at the same time). Out of an innate social-pragmatic inclination A1 performs its power/order building-up practices in different historical contexts; by contrast, out of an innate ethic-mental-spiritual inclination B1 is engaged in promoting the advancement of scientific/theoretical learning about meaning, value, aim and empirical causation concerning actual human life. A1’s social-pragmatic programs are related to the minority of elites carrying organizing-leadership as well as to majority of masses who are always ready to be organized by A1, while B1’s intellectual practices are related to the minority of deep thinkers or spiritual elites who are innately passionate for seeking ethical/scientific truth, independently from the power of A1/A2. Or, exactly, B1 is doomed to be permanently engaged in exploring the ethic-spiritual intelligibility. So the innate interests of A1 and B1 are essentially divergent by nature. But totally speaking, it is B2 that provides human being with advanced knowledge about spiritual meaning of human historical existence, while A2 as social-institutional power-constructions also partly function as the social-materialist conditions for supporting the performance of practices of B1. (The material is to support the spiritual) As a result, there exist two paralleled kinds of practicing-logics: the efforts for material-directed satisfaction and the efforts for spiritual-directed satisfaction, but on the other hand the former provides the latter with material support and the latter provides the former with (earthly) spiritual enlightenment about ethical meaning/value in human existence. ¹Regarding the internal/external interaction between A1 and B1 mentioned above, once again, it is A1 as the power-holder that can externally influence B1 while B1 as the thinker that is unable to influence A1.

Since modern times B2’s modality becomes more and more towards the programs of human-scientific reorganizing efforts through the increased rational sophistication of B1-organizing logic that is realized in the contemporary interdisciplinary/cross-cultural strategy rather than in simply collecting and gathering people from different disciplines, like what we see in current comparative literature and other fields. A great number of further creative efforts wait to be continued and elaborated because of the ever-more increased interdisciplinary/cross-cultural sources, including the richest historical material deposited in the Chinese civilization. In this regard we can see more clearly that without seriously following the genuine B1-logic and cherishing its strong creative passion, which have been however gradually weakened by A1-logic and its results A2 already, nothing seriously important could be expected, even if all achievements of academic masters/stars could be employed along a professionally regulated channels formed under the control of A1-power hierarchy, including its academic part. ¹The academia of the humanities at present day has been deeply penetrated yet by the institutionalized power basically arranged by A1/A2. ²

8. Theoretical-interdisciplinarity strategy and the intelligible accessibility to multi-reality

       in history    

A revolutionary consequences of French Structuralismis expressed initsgeneraltendency for firstly disorganizing and then reorganizing the intellectual/scholarly structures shaped in the existing academic/scientific disciplinary compartmentalization. Its much stronger interdisciplinary inclination isintended to get rid of the academic institutional bondages or therigidifiedstatus quo with a clear aim to create a variety of more original theoretical learning about history, society and the social sciences as such. As pointed out above, differently from the physical-empirical-rational-guided natural and social history formed and developed in modern history, the humanities or human sciences imply a more subjective-pragmatic character in contrast with the objectively organized natural-scientific ones. In this sense the existing humanist-disciplinary regularities prevailing in academia show a historical-artificially formed tendency whose justifications are far from being positively or rationally founded. While such kind of disciplinary network of rules for scholarly operations could become an unjustified restriction on free exploration for scientific understanding aboutdifferent social and intellectual experiences.With respect tothegeneraldeveloping routes of scientific studies we can see a general tendency that is expressed in continuous horizontal/vertical alternation between the individual-disciplinary-directed deepening and the multiple-interdisciplinary widening. Contemporary human sciences indicates a similarly constructive development represented in theirde-philosophical-centrist/interdisciplinary attempts despite that not everything done by them can be taken as scientifically completed or satisfactory; furthermore,wecannot of coursetake them as something fundamental or as certain authoritative models forpromoting global human sciences in future. The meaning of their achievements ismainly indicated bytheir epistemological-directed revelation and fruitful exemplary illustrations. ¹

Human sciences have begun more scientifically developed following the rapid advancement of natural and social sciences, which help lead to the increased consciousness about scientific rationality, empirical positivism and humanist-ethical justification with a clear purpose to make sciences about humanity become a kind of independent rationalizing endeavorsand a sort of productive strengthin our more and more scientificalized/technologicalized world. That means, if the humanist-ethical practices(B1) with respect tothe modernization of the humanities cannotberelevantly organized,they would be much easier under sway of some power-hierarchies of A1/A2, especially those determined bythe economic-domineering powers. Since the economic globalization spreadsextensively worldwide the models of A1/B1interaction mentioned above have changed rapidly as well. A1-logic could therefore interfere in the formation/operation of B1/B2 and make the latter systematically deviated from its own normal course. When A1/A2with its universal marketing power is strong enough, namely when it can determinethe professional-institutional contexts and operationsof B1, or B1-carrierscouldn’t help exclusively operating within the institutionalized framework that is indirectly under the control ofA1/A2, the scholarly practices of B1/B2will bedirectly or indirectly under control oftheimperativeof the related academic marketing. The epistemological orientation and evaluative criteria of entire humanities or human sciences would unavoidably follow the compulsory norms and rules regularize bythe related marketing mechanism. The scholarly direction defined by the professional marketing would be definitely divergent from the genuine humanist-scientific target; and then the emerging scientific-directed endeavors of human sciences would weaken or even lose their scientific-operative independence.Therefore a lot of related practices in the humanities must be changed or readjusted accordingly, such as those concerning selected topics, useful material, attitude of scholars towards doing scholarship, the aim of education and research, scholarly communications, publication, and many others. As a result, the content of the humanities could become even more conveniently and more easily manipulated according to the will of A1/A2. A more successful advanced development would happen when the humanities reach their interdisciplinary-developing stage under the guidance of B1-logic. First of all, the scholarship directed by the related A1-logic, out of economic calculation, would be reluctant to follow these semiotic/hermeneutic-directed approaches that request much longer efforts and more painstaking preparations. According to A1-logic it is more desirable that the single-discipline strategy is preferred than the inter/multi-disciplinary one in consideration of the economy principle requested for organizing professional competition in the academic marketing.  In this sense the interdisciplinary strategy in the humanities will be naturally retarded; or, the interdsciplinarity could be tactically undermined by the way of just arranging the gathering of scholars from different disciplines to show up an appearing presentation of pseudo-interdisciplinary activities without substantially performing horizontal theoretical interaction among different disciplines. The related secret could be more complicatedly found that this pseudo-interdisciplinary tactic could be indirectly encouraged by A1 as a way to expand the academic power/influences by dint of purely increasing numbers of participants who choose to work along the scholarly direction according to A1-line. The true interdisciplinary scholarship must be realized in the theoretical dialogues among different disciplines at the epistemological/methodological levels. In addition to the purpose for expanding influence by increasing the number of participants this fake-interdisciplinary scholarly strategy with a real aim for gaining benefits in academic competition can also effectively obstruct the progress of true interdisciplinary-theoretical scholarship (to use pseudo-interdisciplinary alternative tactic in competition context to actually replace the true interdisciplinary engagement) so as to cause a more substantial theoretical retardation of human sciences.

We can easily raise a lot of academic examples to disclose how widely the academic arrangements have been contextually and pragmatically used to play a kind of non scientific roles in our world of the humanities in connection with planned usages of scholarly terminology, common names of schools, collective promotions of human-scientific stars, international centers or societies, evaluative awarding systems and numberless of other academic-tactic means. As a result, the scholarship processes could function as the tools to increase the professional-utilitarian profits or as the way to build up the academic-institutional power. The same thing can be even more frequently seen in general cultural and communicational realm. All such kinds of phenomena can basically reflect the one-directional causational influences of A1 upon B1/B2. As well known, according to Roland Barthes’ analysis about cultural semiology, there is a famous double conception “denotation/connotation”. (Barthes 2002: 695-698) We may add that this semantic link between the two kinds of signified at the semantic level also implies a more important link between the cultural/academic and the power-organizing aspects at the social-pragmatic level; namely, the heterogeneous/causational link between the “thought” (as denotation) and the “power” (as connotation) can be delicately created. Thus in general, based on the relationship between A1 and B1, the scholarly/intellectual stuff can be used to actualize or to organize the utilitarian projects about building up various interpersonal power-hierarchies. Such kind of heterogeneous-causational connections have in fact frequently emerged and become the determinative means for creating social/political/cultural power-institutions of various types in our academic world. 

In addition, according to a pragmatic semiotic analysis, a right judgment about a negative social reality in history can be even used as an effective means to silently/secretly shape another even worse reality in society; or, for example a justified attack on an really wrong social power-holder’s activities can become the effective means to conceive and reconstruct a even much worse social power-hierarchy in future, just through delicately applying the propaganda technique to make the blindly obedient masses and specializing-narrow-minded  intellectuals trust in the fabricated discourses without having a mind about the hidden evil ambitions. Therefore in history we can see so many examples that an earlier correct attack on the corruption and brutality of a power-system has been intentionally used to organize another even more evil power-systems. For example, in Chinese feudal-imperialist history so many revolting uprisings against the current corrupt regimes had eventually led to the probably same bad or even worse ones after seizing the powers later. Consequently, all power-holders had made use of the same convenient dynastic-Confucialist power-mechanism to realize the same kind of power-seizing/manipulating games in history. (Li, 2015, 157-160) More exactly, as a historical-dialectic observation indicates, the current political/social/cultural/academic situations could just provide a latent ambitious mind (A1-carrier) with a desirable opportunity for cleverly designing and organizing his hidden ambitious projects for organizing new power-hierarchies. One of the efficient means used by an evil A1-carrier at the beginning must well employ the tactic for expressing correct-phrased criticism or blames against the confronted evil power-holders. A historical-pragmatic dialect would be indicated this way: the original justified words can become (be used as) an effective cause/means to realize the later unjustified resultant effect/end. Although human long history has been full of such kind of power-seizing dramas, but the lasting external-directed habits in our observations and judgments have made scholars and thinkers tend so easily to be neglectful of the psychological-motivational reality. By contrast, differently from most Sinologists’ judgments, the original Confucian ethics is especially characterized by its exclusively epistemological focus on the motivational aspects, which chooses on the other side to be operative outside the political/legal/military historical reality. ¹

9. The negative impact of one-disciplinary-central theorization in the interdisciplinary-

      directed contexts of the humanities  

Now let us focus on the related phenomena regarding problems of our semiotic-interdisciplinary strategy once again. One of the professional-institutional obstructing methods against the modernization of the humanities today is directly related to the existing system of academic compartmentalization. The so-called “one discipline” with its historical-deposited implication undertakes two kinds of functions: One as the ground for intellectual/scholarly operations and the other as the ground for promoting professional utilities. As mentioned above, the single disciplinary-central or pseudo-interdisciplinary practices (prevailing everywhere in academic professions today, especially in the fields of multi-cultural studies and comparative literature) become to be more convenient for A1 to handle/manipulate according to its own logic. One of the remarkable achievements of French structuralism is displayed by its promoting the formation of “human sciences” and that is mainly expressed by its adopting creatively original interdisciplinary approaches. The true interdisciplinary practices must be indicated by that one scholar can be deeply engaged in two or more regular disciplines; the requirement will demand a person to spend more time and energy concentrating on one’s scholarly way of thinking and projects without been much calculating his own professional benefits. In the 1960”s period many scholars can still freely choose their spontaneous approaches this way, while in later more seriously institutionalized academic world few scholars dare to stagger in a lasting preparative stage for their interdisciplinary-directed scientific adventures. When a discipline is used as a ground for seeking A1-guided practices (when the scholarship is obviously guided and controlled by professional systems depending on academic marketing), which can be performed by multiple ways in that discipline in connection to the standards chosen, processing rules, academically accepted values, authority-texts adopted, marketing management and other things. All such connected parameters amount to forming a valuable brand for some “quasi-theoretical commodity” that could lead to the final profits judged and awarded by the marketing standards. The related scholars then would behave as the businessmen who are always engaged in promoting their own products. In this sense the academic professionalization functions as applying the individually-handled humanist discipline to a converting process that goes from its B1-terminal partly to A1-terminal; namely, scholarship is at least partly used to obtain some academic-professional profits consisting of material and social elements basically determined by the related power-institutions. Accordingly the orientation of human sciences has been substantially deviated by the commercial-organizing processing, and accordingly scholars would unavoidably change their traditional identity of justice/truth-thinker to that of the profit/power-seeker. The scholarly substantial material remains the same while the organizing guidance and approaches turn to be different yet, nevertheless it is the latter, rather than the former, that defines the scholarly-practicing identity. In essence, the academic powers would be eventually built up on the basis of A1-power-organizers; this implicitly determinative power hierarchy would then become the true guiding organizer of projects carried out in the humanities. The ready availability of this converting processes is especially related to the resultant fact that the scientific contents of the humanities seem to have become less or less connected with empirical-positive scientific approaches and their humanist- ethical dimension.

But the situation mentioned above could be more complicated in connection to the current prevailing tendency of one-disciplinary-central scholarship. The single-disciplinary-central policy, besides its lack in gaining useful theoretical message from other related disciplines, could even cause a deeper theoretical flaw just because of its own over-specialized theoretical sophistication based on the one-disciplinary-technical deepening. The unique result of the one-disciplinary-central technical-specialization as such might be overused as the natural justification for attaining its own profitable achievement within the competitive academic marketing: namely, any kind of technical depth of theoretical discourse organized within one discipline could be used as an easier way to rhetorically make a use of this specializing uniqueness in the competitive marketing. By the way, the deeper the theoretical-specializing degree could be the narrower its applicable zone would be. This is another reason why one-disciplinary-directed theoretical depth could become hardly applicable in enlarged spheres. However, on the other hand any sort of theoretical depth would be habitually mistaken as implying some apparent value by its supposed capability to theoretically interpreting any kind of topics. ¹

Another example with the same origin can be given by the popular admiration for the genius’ individual originality expressed in his inventing new theoretical-discursive rhetoric used in the humanities. The so-called “individual originality” used for performing theoretical texts in the humanities seems to be an awardable principle for promoting the progress of the humanities, but as a matter of fact this principle used in scholarly competition must be also inserted in the game schemes designed by institutionalized academic establishments. The scholarly-practicing originality formalistically created (with no reference to reality) in the established academic marketing must be the one that accords to the general norms/regulations arranged in the academic hierarchy and therefore possibly acceptable to the current intellectual fashion-streams shaped in the marketing (a fashionability can only be formed in the established academic contexts). Then the individual originality expressed in theorizing styles could function merely as a propitious way to be better rhetorically meeting with the competitive games also fixed by academic determinative mechanisms. As a result, however, the scientific criterion of truth has been eventually replaced by an artificial/arbitrarily formed originality indicated by some theoretical-rhetoric wording.

In terms of what described above, any kind of technical uniqueness of verbal formulation or its incomparability created through the one-disciplinary-central sophistical theorization without horizontal interdisciplinary cross-reference or mutual-examination could be finally transformed to be a mere mark used for academic competition. For in this case, except its disconnection with reality, the self-claimed justification of so-called theoretical originality is mainly formed within its own exclusive disciplinary domain. As a matter of fact, the tendency of one-disciplinary-central theoretical/technical deepened results would imply two major second-effects: the one is related to its partial/prejudicial access to reality that is often multi-dimensional-constituted; the other is related to a more serious fault of weakening or losing a requested ethical aspect contained in practices. As a result, all such flaws could be probably covered by the results produced by one-dimensional-directed theoretical/logical sophistication as such; for the latter is frequently lacking in strictly pre-examining its applicable range of interpretation. Furthermore, we will point out an even more serious consequence of such kind of misreading effects in social reality this way: the specializing rhetoric tactics based on a mere one-sided or one-dimensional theoretical depth could be just used to unsuitably support a pseudo-justification for some unjust programs that are designed and controlled by the evil A1 and applied in political, social, cultural or academic realms.

Part 3   The tensional relationship of the two practicing logics and future of human civilization

10. The necessity for interdisciplinary strategy and the motivational impotency for

  independent praxes applied in modernizing human sciences

In terms of above analysis we see that the professional-disciplinary compartmentalization in human sciences not only objectively restricts the advancement of our scientific-theoretical knowledge but also subjectively narrows our epistemological horizon. In addition, a related serious consequence is more basically expressed in the general weakening of the subjective-ethical volition of scholars/thinkers, who are modeled to become the standard specialized-technical-minded operators following the prefixed directions and regulated rules in their scholarly practices. Theoretical scholars would be no more the independent thinker and their scientific object/interest is no longer directed to the reality as such but only to historically accumulated texts authorized in the academic dominative mechanism. On the other hand, since modern history has developed along the ever-democratic line, the compositions of A2 is much more different from what it had been in earlier histories. Nevertheless, the basic parameters of A1 remain to be unchanged, keeping its innate interest in projects about Power-organizing/expansion, either morally positive or negative. Externally it is displayed in various fields ranging from the traditional types such as the political and the religious to the modern ones such as the economic/commercial, scientific/technical, social/cultural and others. All of these external phenomena become the new modes of productions or achievements of A1-organizing-logic. In comparison, the essence of B1 remains unchanged too in human history despite the changeable compositions of its productions. It is in our present-day globalization era when both A1-practices and B1-practices have become technically advanced and enriched with a result that on the one side A1/A2 presents itself as a strongest type of multi-institutionalizing power with its strictly institutionalized domains, and on the other B1/B2 has transformed from its historical pan-literary modality to that of the contemporary human sciences. The strengthened and widened institutional power-hierarchy of A1 and the advanced and deepened rationalization of the theoretical humanities organized by B1 have naturally fallen into increased social-pragmatic conflicts. A1 tends to be more and more pan-commercial-materialized and B1 tends to have more operatively available tools for more productive theoretical creations. In consequence, the interactive relationship between A1 and B1 at social/external level and their mutual segregation at internal level could co-lead to a sharper tensional status concerning these two historical-practicing logics today. Practically, B1-carriers must exist within the regulated social organizations basically determined by A1 with its multiple-social networks A2. On the other hand, present-day B1-carriers couldn’t help becoming the professional dependent upon the economic support of A1-power-institutions; and because of this physical-material dependence B1’s innate practicing mechanism has been systematically undermined by the pan-marketing mechanism of A1/A2. Consequently, the genuine B1-carriers have been reduced to minority of the voluntary humanities-scholars who are willing to insist in doing purely scientific scholarship according to B1-logic in defiance against any possible social allurements/pressures externally caused by A1-power-systems. The point therefore lies in that living in the such fixed social establishments B1-carriers should find a more workable way to keep a paralleled or balanced way to maintain their intellectual independence and autonomy. Nevertheless, the difficulty in forming a reasonable and workable external segregation firstly lies in attaining more pertinent and clearer epistemological/ethical knowledge about our real conditions of intellectual/academic ecology. As we pointed out above, A1 functions as the productive organizers of multiple power systems, together with its various social productions, dealing with ever-increasing ways to satisfy the power-desire of the organizing elites and the happiness-desire of majority of masses alike; while B1 functions as the ethic-spiritual pursuers about meaning, values, mind and causal-motivation concerning human existence in terms of original B-logic and by means of the ever-increasing epistemological/ methodological knowledge historically accumulated in B2. Concretely, the practical tension between A1 and B1 embodied in the relationship of their practices to the academic-institutional contexts; in this tensional relationship the one as the producer and promoter of A2 and the other as the free thinker outside of A2 (as the institutional contexts). From an angle of civilization-evolution, therefore, we should recognize that there exist two basic modes of teleology in human history: the one for pan-materialist social-power constructions (A1/A2) and the other for the pan-ethical/spiritual theoretical constructions (B1/B2). In this tensional context, A1-carriers exist completely in an independent way without taking care of B1/B2’s essential needs, while B1-carriers externally lives in a way of depending on A1/A2. In old times when B1-carriers present themselves in a more mixed mode and therefore they as literary men could play multi-roles by themselves, while in modern periods, owing to the rapidly changed social and intellectual contexts, the B1-carriers could be more and more conscious of his innate identity as the more advanced independent B1-organizer. And then, even if A1, with all its productions, becomes the object of studies of B1-practices, but A1 and B1 both cannot participate in each other’s innate practices. On the other hand, however, the professionalized humanities have already become the productions partly and indirectly determined by A1. In this case, a desirable manner of B1-carriers could be firstly lied in distinguishing between two kinds of operative procedures making use of the same humanist-scholarly documents: the one as the practices pursued according to B1 and the other as the practices to accord with the academic requirements determined by A1. That means, the same scholarly phenomenon can be related to different operations and for the sake of different goals; or, the same historical humanities can become objects of different practicing procedures. After all, however, the essence or identity of a scholarly practice is not determined by its content-material but rather by the ways of organizing the same content-material. In our present-day professional contexts the two different kinds of function and teleology are once again made blurry by these two different usages of the same material. In a word, the stuff of the humanities can be handled either as the ground for pursuing scientific truth or as the ground for seeking professional benefits. In general, these two functions implied in scholarly practices are often widely mistaken as the same things. But the task of B1-carriers today firstly lies in making a clear distinction between the two. This current mixed phenomena concerning scholarly practicing directions reflect another kind of new interaction between A1 and B1, namely externally A1 has already widely/deeply increased its influence upon (or making use of) B1/B2 in our globalization era.

Historical-sociological speaking, A1-logic, as the major promoter of historical-substantial processes responsible for social power/order constructions, becomes today the locomotive of pushing forward the global civilization with its either positive or negative consequences, which, however, from the point –of view of B1, is not relevant to its own projects and destination (B2). On the other side, B1 becomes more and more difficult to carry out its independent practices for advancing its own historical-mission for elevating humanist-ethic-spiritual investigations through systematically elaborating theoretical human sciences. How to overcome this sharp contradiction in current human civilization and its intellectual life in future becomes a significant challenge to the wisdom and ethic of human sciences today.

On the other hand, however, the present central part of B2, the pertinently collected theoretical achievements in human sciences, has also provided ever more effective methodological means used for their rapid development along B1-logic. That means, the traditional pursuit of B1-logic, on the basis of the progress of natural and social sciences, has reached a completely new stage on which a more rationally foreseeable perspective for more relevantly and precisely advancing theoretical understanding about meaning, valuation and historical causation in historical phenomena. Differently from ancient times, however, this domination of A1 over B1 is not realized coercively under our democratic period but rather merely by means of materialist-profitable allurements through making use of the innate weakness of the scholarship and personality in the humanities. In spite of the more accessible practicability of the more desirable interdisciplinary/cross-cultural strategy led and promoted by current semiotic/hermeneutic theories, current humanist-scholars still prefer to simply follow professional routines for obtaining professional profits without being concerned much about the right way for freely searching scientific truth. Why such a collective tendency to choose the self-succumbing attitude in face of the allurements and pressures from A1/A2-power-holders becomes to be so easily shaped today in addition to the known ordinary utilitarian motives? The fact is evidently due to a general weakening of internal ethical consciousness of literati in general who exist in the general legalized systems set up according to academic professionalism determined by A1-logic. Therefore a deeper reason for the unified tendency of the humanities scholars could be based on an acceptable excuse provided by collective consciousness of the general social legalism penetrating academic and intellectual life today.

11.The ethical subjectivity and the legality-reductionist tradition of western moral

  philosophy: The independent historical mission of B1 at the Globalization Era

B1/B2is far from being a tool or object used by A1; it has its own independent task asproceeding withthe ever-increased general Ethic-intellectual elaboration. That its effect and role indirectly involved in A1power context is one thing, and that its effect and role involved directly in B1 logicis the other thing. When the projects performed in A1/A2 passed away forever with their elapsing history, the projects performed in B1/B2, by contrast, will be accumulated forever inB2andtherewithkeep its spiritual-constructive existence constantly. A1 as the Power-organizer has only its individually transient survival in a certain historical spansof time (as the social-material existence,A2 can be hardly stabilized physicallyfor long time), while genuine B1,as the Ethic-thinking-organizer, mustmake its products automatically precipitated in B2 that has been madepermanently thecollective-ethic-spiritual deposit of mankind (as the intellectual existence,B2 can be continued forwardat spiritual level without being destroyed physically). The existential difference of identities and typology ofA1/A2and B1/B2, or popular/simply, “Power” and “Thought”,lies in that all practices in B1can continuously last in history while those produced by A1depend on unexpectedly accidental changes of various kinds in history.By contrast, all resultants of different B1 practices must be interweaved into a consistent intellectual network of ethical-spiritual interconnection (B2).  In other words, historicallyspeaking, the materialist A1practices refer to the tempo-spatially discontinuous agents in history; namely each power-working dynamic networks only exist individually in limited spansof time and definite localities(perhapsthe modern democratic typologycan be exceptional, as we hope), while the Ethical-intellectual B1practices have certainly produced a continuous-holistic-directed collective-spiritual stream across different historical-periodical demarcations. After all, we should pay a special attention to the contrasting relationship of historical existencesbetween temporality/intermittence of Power-constructive praxes (A1) and permanence/continuity of Ethic-creative praxes (B1)

The profound implication of this historical challenge originating in A1/B1 tensional relationship to human civilization and its pragmatic-logical nexus to the lost ethical subjectivity are far from being merely what the present paper has discussed till now. ¹A more serious challenge is even related to the possible deformation of human nature itself in future if we pay a glance to the various IA’s fast development that is definitely caused by A1-logic too. In a word, essentially the basic reason could be interpreted by this reversal relationship ironically embodied in history: In the world of mankind the material-means turns to be the aim while the spiritual-aim turns to be means. Humanity has been bound and dominated by a pan-commercialized technology invented by humanity herself. The unique remaining resisting potential of B1 is hidden in the empirical ethical subjectivity that has been degraded yet or undermined by A1 in collaboration with supernatural-deviation and ontological nihilism latent in B.

As a matter of fact, that B1-carriers’ tendency of so commonly succumbing to the established professional frameworks of the humanities finally determined by A1/A2’s institutional power, in addition to some practical reasons, could be hermeneutically reduced to a universal weakening of ethical consciousness of scholarly subjectivity in our globalization era. This ethical-epistemological linkage between the legalized systems and human sciences has been so widely neglected by the humanities thinkers. From a deeper intellectual-historical perspective we may infer that there exists a deep-rooted epistemological origin in western intellectual history concerning the characterization of western traditional ethical scholarship as such that indicates a traditional mixture of the subjective-ethical way of thinking and the objective-moral way of thinking. The latter can be further represented mainly by the ancient Greek ethics and the medieval theological ethics alike, which both tend to make their utmost-rational grounding of ethical reasoning reduced to the two types of objectivity: the one based on abstract ratio and the other based on the anthropomorphous Super-Being.  These two basic types of western ethical/moral-mixed thoughts have been commonly embodied in the same legality-reductive ethical pragmatics. Because of this traditional legalist reductionism of the ethical thinking the autonomy of subjective-ethical-directed thinking has been almost weakened or even deleted all the time. In general, the subjective-ethical aspect in thinking has been replaced by the pan-legalist aspect in moral thinking, the latter amounts to be a pan-behaviorist way of thought that could ironically turn to be an epistemological obstruction for more profound spiritual sublimation. This could be one of the reasons why modern humanist scholars, who are provided with so much high rational intelligence in our modern scientific times, be liable to obey the professional regularities established by A1/A2. The willingness for obeying the subjective/spiritual-ethical rationality is therefore mixed or replaced by the willingness for obeying an objective/social-moral rationality. Considered in an ethical-logical-genealogical term, we may summarize the above double perplexity concerning ethical praxes respectively performed by A1 and B1 as the following:

       Inside:  At the ethical-axiological level          Outside:  At the social-practicing level

A1:               individualism                                                  collectivism

        (lacking in common subjective-                            (commonly accepted pan-legalism)      

            ethical standard)

B1:                  collectivism                                                individualism

From an angle of global-civilization, a double-directed way to constructively solve the above mentioned epistemological/pragmatic perplexity lies in a dialectic application of the pan-interdisciplinary strategy for dealing with the relational problems between A1 and B1 at this fundamental level. As a result, we should firstly grasp this double-directed relationship between A1 and B1 by the co-existence of their internal-functional separation and external-functional interaction.

And therefore it is natural that the popular justification about the theortical mixture of A1-organizing-logic and B1-organizing-logic could be easily tolerated or even happily accepted by the humanities scholars. On other hand, this moral-legalized way of ethical thinking in our globalization era also makes the scholars further disconnected with the independent humanist-ethical autonomy and therefore the fact is neglected that the mission for advancing human sciences should be based on an independent universal-humanist ethics. This ethical universalism based on secular humanism is completely in logical consistence with the rational-universalism of the human sciences. The idea of the scientific way should just refer to that of the universally valid/applicable way. Then a required ethical collectivism is heterogeneously replaced by sociological-legalist collectivism; accordingly, the so-called individual originality applied in doing scholarship becomes only a chosen concrete means used at the technical level in order to be better workable in that social-legalist system. As a more preferred technique to meet with the established academic systems, this tactic of individual originality turns to be just a more effectively misleading alternative excuse to make humanist scholarship further deviated from its genuine scientific-directed goal. Moreover, the apparent individualism implied in the criterion of so-called scholarly originality happens to accord to the fashion of social-cultural individualism supported by academia in our democracy era. Nevertheless，the essence of democracy essentially lies in the principle of a universal social-political individualism, which is realized in the justified systems to fairly guaranty everybody’s self-interest. That the two kinds of individualism consistently overlapped in one mind is another practical reason why the present-day epistemological criticism given in the humanities could be so widely neglected by scholarly applicants. In terms of this interpretation we may further understand that A1-logic cannot be used to promote B1-practices, and just like B1-logic cannot be used to promote A1-practices either. First of all, we should be clearer about the paralleled co-existing relationship between A1 and B1, including that between politics and the humanities. The fact of segregation and the disconnection between A1/A2 and B1/B2 implies a profound meaning for our understanding a history- philosophical implication involved: The two historical-practicing logics cannot influence each other at the internal level despite that they could be externally merged and mutually interacted; and therefore, despite that A1/A2 are so much powerful, domineering and practically necessary for survival of mankind, B1/B2 still has their independent reason and possibility to keep pursuing its historically-transmitted and innate-rooted noble mission.

Accordingly, for B1-carriers there are two kinds of meanings of  “importance of life” regarding its ethical-spiritual life: the external one related to social physical achievements and the internal one related to the ethic-spiritual-idealist achievements. These two kinds of “importance” are often mixed together in a single mind. But an humanist theoretician should be able to distinguish between the two roles he adopts at the same time: that as the pure professional (partly caused by A1-logic) and that as the true B1-pursuer; he shouldn’t make the two logics and two kinds of tasks mixed together or naively take his unavoidable regular social/political/professional participation as the useful steps for pursuing his own really scientific task guided by B1. On the other hand, he should be also clear that the achievements of his B1-practices couldn’t become a “cause” to positively/negatively influence A1/A2 either. He should in fact calculate wisely about how to handle the actual external interaction between A1 and B1 regarding his two kinds of scholarly engagements. Accordingly, a true B1-carrier shouldn’t mistake the importance of A1-carriers as his own importance based on B1. After all, B1’s collective historical mission merely lies in creating its own B2 rather than using B1/B2 to “serve” A1/A2. If an A1-carrier chooses to learn from or makes use of B2 the matter is only the business of that A1-carrier in his own projects. Otherwise, B1-carrier would relax his own persisting concentration on his own current task—an engagement in constructing global human sciences.

In conclusion, we emphasize that the ethical-humanist thinker as B1-carrier should be more conscious of the two separate “historical-practicing logics”(the power/order- organizing line and the ethic/thought-interweaving line) enwrapped in the single-merged historical stream in human civilizations; accordingly there exist two divergent kinds of meaning/significance in human historical life. The most crucial/essential dichotomy described in a quasi-historical-philosophical term would be better not made between the natural and supernatural worlds but rather between these two divergent modalities of secular existence represented by A1/A2 and B1/B2. The bi-division of the organizing sources/terminals is corresponding to the relationship of the material-conditions of the former to the spiritual-destination of the latter regarding human historical destiny. But it is only the latter that help illustrate or elaborate the deeper meaning/value of humanist life. The fact is that these two organizing lines — the Power-organizing-mechanism is intended to construct the interpersonal-dominating hierarchy and the ethic-organizing-mechanism is intended to create the ethic-theoretical structure — cannot internally participate/interfere in each other; they must keep each other’s segregated and paralleled practices according to their respective different axiological/epistemological logics although externally they exist in sharp tensional interaction. The most recent mode of the ethic-spiritual development is embodied in the human sciences whose further theorization is to be explored and realized through the interdisciplinary-directed rational epistemology/methodology. The latter has been typically represented today by an empirical-positive-ethical-directed General Semiotics (GS), which functions merely as a general all-round reorganizer of humanist knowledge. In terms of this interpretation the general theoretical-semiotic strategy could obtain a historical-philosophical momentum, which would lead even to a possible ethical renovation in human consciousness in confrontation with the ponderous conditions of the materialist-globalization. In terms of this interpretation the semiotic, the human-scientific and the ethical should be consistently unified.

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